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Abstract 
For decades, the development, construction, track ownership 
and operation of mainline railways in China have been 
overseen by the state-owned authorities. From mid-90’s, the 
mainline railway management has undergone revamps to 
revitalize the intra-modal competitiveness of railway 
transportation and to steer it toward the direction of modern 
business management. With the rapid economic growth; the 
large-scale expansion of the mainline network; and the 
increasing expectation on service, the mainline railways in 
China require further restructuring. Inevitably, a sustainable 
approach to ensure business viability and service quality in 
the next few decades is an imminent challenge. This paper 
reviews the operations and management of mainline railway 
in China and discusses the possibility of introducing open 
access market. Drawing the experiences on railway open 
markets outside China, the discussions include the need and 
feasibility of railway open market in China; and the suitability 
and limitations of different models. Particular considerations 
will be given to the unique characteristics of the mainline 
railways in China, where the developments across 
neighbouring regions are unbalanced; freight and passenger 
services are of similar demands; and the high-speed train 
operations are operated with low-speed ones in mixed traffic. 
1 Introduction 
In the 1980s, most developed countries, especially in North 
America, suffered from critical decline in mainline railways, 
in terms of service quality and revenue even though railway 
still had many advantages over other transportation modes. 
Railways are appealing because of their relatively smaller 
scale of land use, lower consumption of energy and less 
pollution to the environment [9]. It is commonly conceived 
that railways fulfil the requirements of sustainable 
development better [9], and they remain the dominant mode 
of transportation for most countries worldwide.  However, 
revitalisations on mainline railway operations were called for 
in order to keep pace with the modern-day business 
requirements and customer demands.    
 
The revival of the mainline railways has come from two 
directions. On one hand, railroad infrastructures have been 
massively renewed. The new era is characterised by high-
speed network. Inspired examples are found in Japan, France 
and Germany while other developing countries (e.g., China) 
have ambitious plans of high-speed railroad. On the other 
hand, business structures of the railways in most developed 
countries have been reorganised. It is known as railway 
privatisation, and manifested in the deregulation of the 
service provision from the governments and the separation of 
railroad infrastructure from operations. For example, most of 
the EU countries began to reorganise their railways during the 
1990s, in accordance with a series of resolutions of the 
European Conference of Minister of Transport, such as 
ECMT Resolutions 93/6 and 95/3, and directives of the 
Council of the EU (e.g., Directives 91/440, 95/18 and 95/19) 
[6]. The resolutions and directives established provisions for 
the licensing of railway undertakings, allocation of 
infrastructure capacity, and access of the previously 
government-owned rail networks for private operators [15]. 
The privatisation resulted in new business models which are 
nowadays collectively referred as open access markets.  
 
The open access to the market was introduced primarily to 
encourage intra-modal competitiveness and alleviate financial 
burden from the public subsidies, thus enhancing the overall 
efficiency and producing better service quality to customers 
and stronger inter-modal competitiveness [3,7,8]. It has 
however been argued that one of the most important 
objectives, reduction of governmental subsidies to the 
infrastructures, was hardly achieved after the privatisation of 
the industry and the introduction of open markets [2,3,16,20].  
 
Different open access market models are adopted worldwide 
and they become a common trend for mainline railways. 
However, it is not necessary for different countries to share 
the same open market model. The model adopted is 
determined by various factors, such as the scale of the 
network, technologies in train operations, number of 
stakeholders in the market, equitability of strength of different 
entities, and current market share. It is also likely that the 
regulations, policies and recent performance of the economy 
in the country or region carry impacts on the success of the 
model adopted for the open access market. In addition, the 
development history of the railway operation plays an 
important role in the adoption of a particular model.  
 
Mainline railways in China are now moving towards a new 
era, where old lines are renewed and new passenger express 
lines are being constructed. The development is geared at 
separating passenger services from freight ones and providing 
high-speed networks for passenger services. The technologies 
of infrastructures construction, service provisions and system 
maintenance have reached the same standards adopted in 
many developed countries. More importantly, the 
development of mainline railways provision is always the 
priority of the state infrastructure. Heavy investments have 
been put into further expansion of the railway network and 
massive construction projects have taken place all over the 
country. Since 2003, China has built 30,000km railroads with 
an overall investment around ¥2,000 billion. The Ministry of 
Railway also plans to add another 17,000km new track to the 
current network by the end of 2010. At the same time, 
15,000km of existing track will be upgraded (mainly with 
electrification). By 2012, the total length of tracks in service 
will reach 110,000km, including 13,000km of passenger 
express and inter-city lines, on which the train speed is over 
200km/h [17]. The scale of investment in the fixed assets is 
unique in the history of railway development.  
 
Further to the infrastructure renewal and construction, the 
mainline railways in China also began to enhance its 
management and operations in 2005. It has to be stressed that 
such enhancement is not to the same extent as the reforms in 
the western countries. It is only similar to the early stage of 
the western railways revitalisations (characterised by 
hardware upgrade and organisation restructuring). Against 
such backdrop, it is thus an appropriate time to discuss the 
possible need of open market for the mainline railways in 
China, and if so, the suitable market model. 
 
This paper first discusses the commonly adopted open market 
models nowadays. Three specific models are introduced and 
their performance characteristics and impacts are analysed. 
The present operation features of mainline railways in China 
are then presented, followed by discussions on feasibility of 
possible open market models for Chinese railway. Emphasis 
is placed on the suitability and limitations of different models 
of open markets for the mainline railways in China. 
2 Commonly adopted open market models 
2.1 Market models 
In the last few decades, railway industries in the western 
countries were restructured in different ways. However, they 
shared a similarity that, compared with the situation prior to 
the reforms, independent or semi-independent companies 
were introduced to the railroad market. ‘Independent’ here 
refers to commercial freedom or degree of autonomy from 
government control, with respect to commercial interests [6]. 
Although there was a trend of the operation of mainline 
railways being deregulated, different countries did not 
provide the same degree of freedom in the market. 
‘Independence’ is used to describe this difference here and it 
thus distinguishes itself from different open market models.  
 
Furthermore, businesses involved in railway operations have 
been specialised (e.g. train operation was separated from 
infrastructure management). This gave birth to many 
stakeholders who only provide one service in the market.  
Separation is one of the approaches to disaggregate the 
railway systems. It was initially stated in the Directive 91/440 
of the EU Council for accounting purposes, favouring a 
tighter accounting focus on train operation and infrastructure 
management and providing transparency in the use of public 
funds in the railway [6]. Separation also helps enhance non-
discriminatory access to potential tracks, as well as 
competitions for the use of the infrastructure.  
 
Current open market models in different railway industries 
are investigated and evaluated in terms of independence and 
separation. Four distinctive independences of the railway 
operations can be identified [6,7,8]: (1) privately-owned 
companies (typical instances can be found in UK and US); (2) 
state-owned joint companies (in a majority of the EU 
countries, Norway, Switzerland and a minority of eastern and 
central European countries, also in Australia); (3) state 
enterprises conferred with commercial freedom (in a minority 
of the EU countries); and (4) state enterprises with limited 
commercial freedom (in a majority of central and eastern 
European countries).  
 
Nevertheless, there are slight differences in the separation 
pattern, distinguished also by company natures [1,6,7,8,21]: 
(1) independent infrastructure and operation entities (in 
Portugal and a majority of northern European countries); and 
(2) integration to be retained, but with separate business units 
in most cases (in US, Japan, Australia, Ireland, Spain, and a 
majority of central and eastern European countries).  
 
According to the degree of independence and separation in 
the current railway market, three open market models are 
classified: (A) the market is composed of several vertically 
integrated train companies in different areas and some 
separated companies that provide specialised services, with 
all business units having commercial freedom; (B) the railway 
systems and business units are vertically separated in the 
market which is composed of specialised companies that only 
produce one type of service (such as infrastructure providers 
and train operation companies); and (C) the model A or B is 
further cultivated, allowing open access to third-party 
operators (other than competitors in the first two models) who 
are franchised by the regulatory authorities and limited to 
certain special (or exclusive) services. From models A to C, 
the degrees of both the independence of business units and the 
market openness are increasing. 
2.2 Performance and impacts 
Instances of model A can be found in US, Japan and 
Australia. The railway passenger services in US were 
separated from the freight ones and passed on to Amtrak, a 
government-owned corporation, in 1970. However, in the 
freight market, the US’s railway services are divided into 
three classes: Class I railways, regional railroads and small 
(short) lines [7]. They are operated by private firms in a 
vertically-integrated mode (i.e. these firms have the 
ownership of tracks) [15]. In Australia, some states keep part 
of the rail infrastructure, while some separate the ‘below-rail’ 
infrastructure from train operation. As such, the Australia Rail 
Track Corporation (undertaking train operation) and the Rail 
Infrastructure Corporation (looking after rail infrastructure) 
were formed. There are also states which lease their 
infrastructure to private companies (such as Freight Australia, 
Australia Railroad Group, Australia Transport Network). 
Each state has set up its own rail access regime [1].  
 
Models B and C are adopted by most of the EU countries, of 
which UK and Sweden stand out. Swedish railway consists of 
two distinct units, the national track authority Banverket (BV) 
and the national operator Statens Järnvägar (SJ) [6,15,16]. 
Though they are state-owned enterprises, train services are 
contracted out by tenders and there is no tariff regulation. In 
addition to SJ, there are private operators in the railway 
markets, operating either regional services or feeder traffic for 
SJ [6]. In UK, railway undertakings have been deregulated 
and each business unit in the railway market has autonomy in 
managing its own affairs. As a result, almost all passenger 
services were privatised, and the rail track, rolling stock, 
maintenance service and train operations were run by 
independent sectors. In the railway market, there are different 
specialised companies, such as infrastructure providers (IPs, 
which is now the role of Network Rail), rolling stock 
providers (RSPs), maintenance service providers (MSPs) and 
train operation companies (TOCs) [3,6,10,13,14,18,22,23,25]. 
In addition, third-party operators (open access operators) are 
also allowed to the market. Although these operators only 
undertake some regional or special train services, the intra-
modal competition has been strongly enhanced.  
 
In general, as the degree of independence of the stakeholders 
is in an ascending order from models A to C. Models B and C 
provide more flexibility and a smaller network may benefit 
from models B and C. On network scale, a general 
development is observed from the history of different 
railways. Railroads were originally constructed locally, with 
short lines or small networks for the sole purpose of meeting 
local demands. With the development of inter-regional 
economy, cross-border traffic demand increased, which 
required elimination of obstacles for traffic exchange among 
different local railways. In some countries (such as US and 
Australia), collaboration naturally crept in and even led to 
merger among local railways. Finally, several large networks 
or even a national one were formed. This is the background 
for US, Australia and others to produce model A. However, 
for the EU, it is difficult to develop such collaboration among 
the countries as the differences of railway infrastructures 
among these countries are quite significant. As a result, the 
EU adopted a different approach and finally led to models B 
and C. It should be noted that the railway infrastructures are 
still owned by the state and regional authorities and train 
operators are allowed to participate freely. As such, train 
services across countries or regions are conducted by one or 
more operators who attain the leases of railway infrastructures 
from the corresponding infrastructure owners. However, with 
separation of train service from infrastructure, the 
infrastructure owners encountered new difficulties when more 
stakeholders (e.g. private train operators) were introduced. 
They included allocating railway resources or timetabling, 
producing and evaluating railway timetables and establishing 
access charge systems [1,4,11,12,19,23,24]. 
3 Mainline railways operation in China 
3.1 Business model 
Management of the mainline railways in China have been 
through two distinct phases in the last 50 years. They are 
characterised by planned economy and market economy 
respectively. In both phases, a centralised and hierarchical 
management model is adopted. In the first phase, there were 
four levels in this model, the Ministry of Railway (MOR), 
bureaus, sub-administrations and depots and stations. The 
MOR, being at the top level, has the overall authorities on 
planning, control and management. Railway bureaus and sub-
administrations operate at large and medium cities, according 
to national administrative divisions. Depots and stations are 
basic units to conduct train services under the supervision of 
the bureaus and sub-administrations. The hierarchy, including 
number of levels and their roles, changed over time. During 
the period of planned economy, the MOR had absolute 
authorities on transportation plans. It was also empowered 
with the statutory authority to formulate national practices 
and standards and to propose legislations. Railway bureaus 
and sub-administrations had little autonomy in planning and 
business operation. They only supervised and organised their 
sub-departments (such as depots and stations) to complete 
operational tasks assigned by the MOR. 
 
In the 1980s, as the national economy began to pick up, 
certain railway regulations were gradually relaxed. The MOR 
adopted prescriptive and instructional transportation planning. 
The former were mandatory while the latter were only 
guidelines. This new system allowed the bureaus and sub-
administrations to revise instructional planning and enabled 
them to make local plans. The bureaus and sub-
administrations then began to play limited business roles and 
assumed certain autonomy in management and business 
decisions. From 1990s, this trend was further enhanced. They 
were given extensive autonomy in managing rail 
transportations but the major policies or issues were still 
supervised and controlled by the MOR [5]. In 1993, the 
Guangzhou railway bureau was reorganised and the 
Guangzhou Railway (Group) Corporation was founded, 
which was a key step for the bureaus and sub-administrations 
to take up important business role.   
 
Meanwhile, non-national railways are also in operation. They 
are not within the MOR hierarchy and usually operated in one 
of the following formats: local railways constructed by local 
governments or companies; consortium by a combination of 
the MOR, local governments, private corporations and others; 
or special railways provided for particular purposes. In the 
railway market, non-national railways often serve as the 
feeders to the trunk railways. However, they are also 
competitors for the MOR services. 
3.2 Latest development 
In 2005, the MOR reorganised its structure by withdrawing 
all sub-administrations and adding three new bureaus. The 
hierarchy is now divided into three levels, the MOR, eighteen 
bureaus and a good number of depots and stations, as shown 
in Fig. 1.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Management hierarchy of mainline railways in China 
 
However, the independent business role of the bureaus, with 
the exception of corporations such as the Guangzhou Railway 
(Group) Corporation, is weakened. The MOR clawed back 
the authority on allocating resources for the national network 
and it tends to become a new single business entity in the 
multi-mode transportation market. On the other hand, private 
entities are encouraged to invest on various aspects of railway 
operations, such as rail construction, service provision and 
facility manufacture. As a result, a large number of joint-
investment projects are now undertaken and they are in line 
with the railway development policy of the country [5].  
4 Possible open market models for China 
The mainline railways in China are taking cautious and 
gradual steps on reforms nowadays. Relevant policies are put 
forward for basic revamps, such as abandoning ancillary 
businesses, reorganising the bureaus toward the establishment 
of public companies and enhancing the investment channels 
for private entities. Although the reform is still slow, it is set 
up toward the direction of relaxing regulations and 
constraints, opening parts of the industry for access from 
private sectors, and introducing modern business management 
and intra-modal competitiveness. The natural next step for the 
mainline railways in China to move on is to explore and 
develop open market. However, it is advisable not to blindly 
impose the models from other countries, but investigate the 
suitability of different models and develop an appropriate one 
to fit the unique purposes and characteristics of the railways 
in China.   
4.1 Model A 
The model A was formed on the background that there were 
several large railway networks and corporations which 
provided local and exchange/transfer services. At present, 
mainline railways in China are mainly divided into eighteen 
bureaus. They did not naturally evolve from a free market, but 
established for specific administrative purposes. They were 
indeed arranged into different administrative divisions, which 
are not compatible with the market needs nowadays. This 
arrangement was originally made out under the condition that 
the demands of railway transportation were planned.  
 
It must be realised that the demands on the exchange services 
(such as inter-city to local services) are substantial in China 
and thus collaborations among the bureaus are crucial. In 
other words, their roles as independent business units are 
compromised. Thus, introduction of genuine competition may 
be difficult if the bureaus are to operate in the open market 
model A. Further, the developments across neighbouring 
regions in China are often unbalanced.  Even if the bureaus 
are empowered with independent business roles, it is not 
possible to ensure fairness in competition. Therefore, the 
model A is not suitable for China for the time being.  
 
Nevertheless, the MOR has begun reorganisation of some of 
the bureaus in order to meet the requirements of open market. 
One example is the Zhengzhou Bureau which has been 
restructured, with three newly-founded bureaus. They are 
more adaptive to local needs but still within the framework of 
MOR administration. If the open market model A is to be 
adopted, the bureaus require further restructuring.  
4.2 Model B 
Open market model B is encouraged by the EU to overcome 
the difficulty of merging the railway networks of different 
countries. It is one of the means to eliminate obstacles at 
borders, develop seamless exchange/transfer services and 
result in an integrated market eventually. It is however not the 
case in China, where the mainline railways are always 
integrated and there are few obstacles across different 
regions. Indeed, it is already an integrated mainline railway 
system in China, though the market is characterised as a 
monopoly. 
 
Although the model B has an advantage of enabling more 
competition than model A does, it brings out other technical 
difficulties which attribute to the practical operation 
conditions of mainline railways in China: (1) freight and 
passenger services are of similar demands and operated on the 
same networks; (2) high-speed trains are often operated with 
low-speed ones; and (3) there are extensive long-distance and 
exchange/transfer services (which lead to numerous 
connections among different service providers).  
4.3 Model C 
The model C is literally the advancement of model A or B, 
with third-party competitors introduced. In China, non-
national railways may take this position .The non-national 
railways in China are however not genuinely independent. 
Currently, three types of management are found among the 
non-national railways [5]: (1) operated by local governments 
or private investors; (2) delegated to local bureaus; and (3) 
managed by a combination of local governments, private 
investors and bureaus. In general, the MOR and its bureaus 
are involved in the management to certain extent. Moreover, 
the MOR is not only the operator but also the regulator. 
Hence, the non-national railways are not as competitive as the 
MOR services. It is anticipated that the growth of non-
national railways will be encouraged by more economic 
incentives and further reorganising of MOR in the near future. 
4.4 Suggestions 
From the above analysis, it is suggested that a combination of 
models A and C is feasible for the mainline railways in China. 
They should be given ample time to develop in parallel as 
both MOR services and non-national railways exist now. 
However, it is still a long way to move from the current status 
quo to an open market model. Firstly, the MOR and its 
bureaus should be further reorganised. It is necessary for the 
bureaus to eliminate the boundaries between administration 
divisions. More mergers of railway bureaus should be 
undertaken to simplify the structure. Parallel train services 
provided by different bureaus should be allowed, which is the 
basis for introducing intra-mode competition. Secondly, as 
non-national railways are still the minority, more local 
railways and private consortiums should be encouraged. 
Finally, certain privileges currently only given to the MOR 
should be made available to all operators, which requires 
changes on the corresponding policies and regulations. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper discusses the possible need of open market for the 
mainline railways in China and analyses the suitable market 
model. It introduces three specific open market models from 
the reforms worldwide, followed by the analysis of the 
feasibility of each model for mainline railways in China, with 
respect to the current business model and its evolution. It is 
suggested that a combination of certain models is more 
preferable and a thorough reform on the MOR is necessary. 
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